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Abstract
In an empirical logic, an experimentally verifiable proposition P relating to a quantum system
is assigned the value of either true of false if the system is in the pure state that belongs or,
respectively, does not belong to the Hilbert subspace that represents P . Determined in such a
way truth or falsity of P can be termed a factual truth-value of P . In the present paper, it is
proposed to consider a counter-factual truth-value of P , i.e., either of the values, true or false,
that might have been taken by P if the system had been in a pure state belonging to a Hilbert
subspace that does not represent P . The assumption that it is always possible to speak mean-
ingfully of counter-factual truth-values of experimental propositions can be called the hypothesis
of propositional counter-factual definiteness. As it is shown in the paper, this hypothesis lies at
the basis of the EPR paradox, a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy
predictions of quantum mechanics, such as one that measurements of spin along the different
axes are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified
by declining to paste together invariant-subspace lattices of contexts associated with the system
(in other words, Boolean algebras or blocks) into one Hilbert lattice. Without such pasting, the
EPR paradoxical inference cannot be reached.
Keywords: Closed linear subspaces; Lattice structures; Hilbert lattice; Invariant-subspace lat-
tices; Assignment of truth values; Counter-factual definiteness; EPR paradox.
1 Introduction
As stated by the axioms underlying an empirical logic [1, 2], quantum propositions – i.e., exper-
imentally verifiable (or at least potentially falsifiable) propositions relating to a quantum system
– are represented by corresponding closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space H associated with
the system. Following upon that, conditions and rules imposed on the quantum propositions are
determined by partial binary lattice-theoretic operations on those subspaces [3].
To implement this logic, the quantum proposition P is assigned the value of true if the system is
in the pure state |Ψ〉 belonging to the subspace HP that represents P [4]. This can be expressed as
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP )
]]
v
= true , (1)
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where P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP ) stands for “P in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HP ”. Otherwise, i.e., if the system is in the
pure state that does not reside in HP , the proposition P is assigned the value of false:
[[
P (|Ψ〉 /∈ HP )
]]
v
= false . (2)
Along with determined in such a way truth or falsity of the proposition P , which can be termed
a factual truth-value of P , one can consider a counter-factual truth-value of P , namely, either of
the values, true or false, that might have been taken by P if, instead of the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HP or
|Ψ〉 /∈ HP , the system had been in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ where HQ is a subspace of H that does not
represent P . Whether it is possible to treat a counter-factual truth-value as it were a factual one,
that is, if it is possible to speak meaningfully of the truth-value of the quantum proposition P in
the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ, must apparently depend on the lattice-theoretic ordering relation ≤ over the
subspaces HQ and HP .
For example, suppose that HQ ≤ HP ; this means that HQ is co-aligned with HP such that HQ is
a subset of HP . In that case, the state |Ψ〉, which lies in the subspace HQ, belongs to the subspace
HP as well; therefore, the counter-factual truth-value of the quantum proposition P in the state
|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ can be treated the same as the factual truth-value of P in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HP . In
symbols,
HQ ≤ HP :
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ)
]]
v
=
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP )
]]
v
= true . (3)
By contrast, suppose that HQ  HP and HP  HQ. This means that the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ can
be a member of HP only if |Ψ〉 = 0, where 0 is the zero-vector, i.e., the solitary vector contained
in the zero-dimensional subspace {0}, a proper subset of any closed linear subspace of H. But,
since any state |Ψ〉, full of physical meaning, must differ from 0, it follows that the counter-factual
truth-value of P in |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ can be treated the same as the factual truth-value of P in |Ψ〉 /∈ HP ,
namely,
HQ  HP ,HP  HQ:
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ)
]]
v
=
[[
P (|Ψ〉 /∈ HP )
]]
v
= false . (4)
The assumption that the counter-factual truth value can be definite for any pair of subspaces HQ
and HP , that is,
∀ {HQ,HP } :
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ)
]]
v
= t ∈ {true, false} , (5)
can be called the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness. The purpose of this paper
is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified by declining to paste together invariant-subspace
lattices of different contexts associated with a quantum system (i.e., Boolean algebras or blocks)
into a Hilbert lattice of the system. Without such pasting, the counter-factual inference lying at
the basis of the EPR paradox (arguing against the prediction of quantum mechanics maintaining
2
that measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible) cannot be reached.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
Before demonstrating this, some definitions and preliminaries are in order first.
Definition 1. Any closed linear subspace HP of a Hilbert space H is the range of some projection
operator Pˆ (i.e., self-adjoint idempotent operator) acting on H [5]. Explicitly, HP is identical to
the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are in the image of the projection operator Pˆ :
HP ≡ ran(Pˆ ) =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H: Pˆ |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
. (6)
In the same way, the closed linear subspace H⊥P ⊆ H, which is orthogonal to HP , is identical to the
kernel of Pˆ , i.e., the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are mapped to zero by Pˆ , explicitly,
H⊥P ≡ ker(Pˆ ) = ran(1ˆ− Pˆ ) =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H: (1ˆ− Pˆ )|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
, (7)
where 1ˆ stands for the identity operator on H. For that reason, the projection operator 1ˆ− Pˆ can
be understood as the negation of Pˆ , i.e.,
¬Pˆ = 1ˆ− Pˆ . (8)
As consequences of (6) and (7), one has
HP ∩H
⊥
P = ran(Pˆ ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ ) = ran(0ˆ) = {0} , (9)
HP +H
⊥
P = ran(Pˆ ) + ran(¬Pˆ ) = ran(1ˆ) = H , (10)
where ∩ denotes the set-theoretic operation of intersection, 0ˆ is the zero operator on H, the sum of
the subspaces HP +H
⊥
P is defined as the set of sums of vectors from HP and H
⊥
P , while the subsets
{0} and H are the trivial subspaces of H (which correspond to the trivial projection operators 0ˆ
and 1ˆ, respectively).
Definition 2. A set of two or more nontrivial projection operators PˆA, PˆB, . . . on H is called a
context Σ
Σ =
{
PˆA, PˆB , . . .
}
(11)
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if the next requirements are satisfied:
PˆAPˆB = PˆBPˆA = 0ˆ , (12)
PˆA + PˆB + · · · =
∑
Pˆ∈Σ
Pˆ = 1ˆ . (13)
In view of the exact correspondence existing between the projection operator Pˆ and the proposition
P represented by the closed linear subspace ran(Pˆ ), one may also refer to the context Σ as the set
of the compatible propositions:
Σ =
{
PˆA, PˆB , . . .
}
⇐⇒ Σ = {PA, PB , . . . } . (14)
Definition 3. A subspace P ⊆ H is called an invariant subspace under the projection operator Pˆ
on H if
Pˆ : P → P . (15)
This means that the image of every vector |Ψ〉 in P under Pˆ remains within P which can be written
as
PˆP =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ P: Pˆ |Ψ〉
}
⊆ P . (16)
As it can be readily seen, P = ran(Pˆ ) and P = ker(Pˆ ), in addition to P = {0} and P = H.
Definition 4. The set of all the invariant subspaces P of the Hilbert space H invariant under the
projection operator Pˆ can be determined by:
L(Pˆ ) =
{
P ⊆ H: PˆP ⊆ P
}
. (17)
Consider the set of the invariant subspaces L(Σ) invariant under every projection operator from
the context Σ:
L(Σ) = L(PˆA) ∩ L(PˆB) ∩ · · · =
⋂
Pˆ∈Σ
L(Pˆ ) . (18)
4
The elements of this set form a complete lattice called the invariant-subspace lattice of the context
[6]. The lattice operations on L(Σ) are defined in an ordinary way: For instance, the meet ∧ and
the join ∨ are defined by
HA,HB ∈ L(Σ) =⇒
{
HA ∧HB = HA ∩HB ∈ L(Σ)
HA ∨HB =
(
(HA)
⊥ ∩ (HB)
⊥
)⊥
∈ L(Σ)
. (19)
It is straightforward to verify that each invariant-subspace lattice L(Σ) contains only mutually
commuting subspaces (corresponding to mutually commutable projection operators), which means
that each L(Σ) is a Boolean algebra.
Definition 5. The set {L(Σ)}Σ∈O ≡ {Σ ∈ O : L(Σ)} is the collection of the invariant-subspace
lattices that is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of all the contexts O associated with the
quantum system.
If all the lattices from {L(Σ)}Σ∈O are pasted (or stitched) together at their common elements –
which are (aside from identical elements) the trivial subspaces {0} and H – then the resulted logic
will be the Hilbert lattice L(H) [7]:
L(H) =
⋃
Σ∈O
L(Σ) , (20)
where ∪ denotes the set-theoretic union carried out simultaneously on elements of {L(Σ)}Σ∈O. In
this sense, the Hilbert lattice L(H) is the union of the collection {L(Σ)}Σ∈O.
Providing the set of all the contexts O form a continuum, the Hilbert lattice can also be called a
continuum of pasting of the invariant-subspace lattices (Boolean algebras) L(Σ) ∈ {L(Σ)}Σ∈O.
3 Logic account of the EPR paradox and its resolutions
The EPR paradox is a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy the prediction
of quantum mechanics that it is impossible to know both the position and the momentum of a
quantum particle [8]. In Bohm’s formulation of this paradox [9], the challenge is extended to the
prediction that measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible. The EPR paradox
is still a centerpiece in the ongoing debates over the interpretation of quantum theory.
Let’s consider the logic account of Bohm’s formulation of the EPR paradox, that is, the description
of the paradox based on experimentally verifiable propositions and their truth-values. The reason
of this description is that it allows one to analyze the paradox using exclusively logic that is tied
to the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics, with no philosophical discussion on how to
interpret the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics.
Imagine a system with a pair of nonidentical one-half spin particles (e.g., an electron and a positron)
which are prepared in a singlet state (i.e., a state with total spin angular momentum 0). Suppose
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that after being prepared, the particles 1 and 2 travel away from each other in a region of zero
magnetic field where by means of Stern-Gerlach magnets corresponding observers 1 and 2 measure
the spin of the matching particle.
When the observer N ∈ {1, 2} measures the spin of the particle N along, say the z-axis, the observer
verifies either the proposition “The spin of the particleN along the z-axis is +~
2
” (abbreviated to the
symbol PNz+) or the proposition “The spin of the particle N along the z-axis is −
~
2
” (abbreviated
to the symbol PNz−) that are represented by the subspaces H1z+ and H1z−, respectively. Assume,
the observer 1 verifies the proposition P1z+, which can be described as
[[
P1z+
(
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+
)]]
v
= true , (21)
where |Ψ1〉 refers to the pure quantum state of the particle 1 (correspondingly, |Ψ2〉 refers to the
pure state of the particle 2).
Provided H1z− = H
⊥
1z+ and so the subspaces H1z+ and H1z− are incomparable with each other,
i.e., H1z+  H1z− and H1z−  H1z+, this observer infers in accordance with (4):
[[
P1z−
(
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+
)]]
v
=
[[
P1z−
(
|Ψ1〉 /∈ H1z−
)]]
v
= false . (22)
Moreover, in the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H1), i.e., in the union of the invariant-subspace
lattices of the contexts associated with the particle 1, the subspace H1z+ is also incomparable with
both subspaces H1x+ andH1x− representing respectively the propositions “The spin of the particle 1
along the x-axis is +~
2
” and “The spin of the particle 1 along the x-axis is −~
2
” (abbreviated to the
symbols P1x+ and P1x− in that order). Consistent with (4), this entails the following counter-factual
truth-values of these propositions:
[[
P1x±
(
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+
)]]
v
=
[[
P1x±
(
|Ψ1〉 /∈ H1x±
)]]
v
= false . (23)
At this point, recall that the Hilbert space for two entangled (nonidentical) particles is the tensor
product H1⊗ H2 of the two Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 for the separate particles 1 and 2. By
reason of the initial singlet state of the spins of these particles, when the particle 1 is in the state
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+, the composite system of the entangled particles must be in the product state:
|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1 ≡ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ2〉 ∈ H1z+ ⊗H2z− . (24)
In accordance with the rule (1), this implies
[[
(P1z+ ⊓ P2z−) (|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1)
]]
v
= true , (25)
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where the abbreviation (P1z+ ⊓ P2z−) stands for the proposition “The spin of the particle 1 along
the z-axis is +~
2
and the spin of the particle 2 along the z-axis is −~
2
”.
Because this proposition in the product state (24) is equivalent to the disjunction of the propositions
P1z+ in the state |Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+ and P2z− in the state |Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z− (see the exposition of this argument
in [10, 11]), i.e., in symbols,
(P1z+ ⊓ P2z−) (|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1) = P1z+ (|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+) ⊓ P2z− (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−) , (26)
the observer 1 can calculate using (25) the counter-factual truth-value of the proposition P2z−:
[[
P2z− (|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+)
]]
v
=
[[
P2z− (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−)
]]
v
= true . (27)
Within the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H1⊗H2) imposed on the closed linear subspaces of the
tensor product H1⊗H2, the subspaces Z1 = H1z+⊗H2z− and Z2 = H1z−⊗H2z+ are incomparable
with X1 = H1x+⊗H2x− and X2 = H1x−⊗H2x+, i.e., both subspaces that represent the propositions
“The spin of the particle 1 along the x-axis is ±~
2
and the spin of the particle 2 along the x-axis
is ∓~
2
” abbreviated into (P1x± ⊓ P2x∓). As an inference from this fact, the observer 1 obtains the
counter-factual truth-values of (P1x± ⊓ P2x∓) similar to ones in (23):
[[
(P1x± ⊓ P2x∓)
(
|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1
)]]
v
=
[[
(P1x± ⊓ P2x∓)
(
|Ψ12〉 /∈ X1,2
)]]
v
= false . (28)
On the other hand, since the propositions (P1x± ⊓ P2x∓) in the product state (24) are equivalent
to the disjunctions of the propositions, i.e.,
(P1x± ⊓ P2x∓) (|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1) = P1x± (|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+) ⊓ P2x∓ (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−) , (29)
and, thanks to (23), P1x± have the definite counter-factual truth-values in the state |Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+,
the observer 1 finds:
[[
P2x∓ (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−)
]]
v
= t ∈ {true, false} . (30)
Together with (27) it may possibly imply that the quantum propositions P2z− and P2x−, equally
as P2z− and P2x+, can be verified simultaneously, i.e.,
[[
P2z− (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−) ⊓ P2x∓ (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−)
]]
v
= true . (31)
This constitutes the EPR paradox: From apparently true premises (23) and (28), and by seemingly
uncontroversial reasoning, the conclusion is drawn that contradicts quantum mechanics.
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To avoid the EPR paradoxical conclusion (31), one may assume that the principle of locality does
not hold and, therefore,
[[
P1z+ (|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+) ⊓ P2x∓ (|Ψ2〉 ∈ H2z−)
]]
v
= false . (32)
That is, the verification of the proposition P1z+ makes false not only both P1x− and P1x+, i.e.,
the propositions which relate to the same particle, but also both P2x− and P2x+, the propositions
relating to another particle situated at a distance away.
Alternatively, i.e., making the conclusion (31) incorrect but with that holding the principle of
locality, one may deny propositional counter-factual definiteness in the case where the quantum
propositions cannot be verified simultaneously, i.e., they are incompatible. Along these lines, one
can maintain that the counter-factual truth-values (23) and (28) are not admissible [12, 13] because
they violate the following condition:
∑
P∈Σ
[[
P
]]
b
= 1 , (33)
where b stand for the bivaluation [14], i.e., the assignment of the values 1 and 0 (which denote
true and false, respectively) to the propositions P from the context Σ. Due to the violation of the
stipulated condition for the context Σ1x = {P1x+, P1x−} in the state |Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+, the propositions
P1x± must be declared undefined in this state, i.e.,
[[
P1x±
(
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+
)]]
b
6= b ∈ {1, 0} . (34)
Likewise,
[[
(P1x± ⊓ P2x∓) (|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1)
]]
b
6= b ∈ {1, 0} . (35)
4 Regarding the notion of admissibility
The admissibility condition (33) stems from the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Probabilities and expectations on Boolean algebras (or blocks) of an empirical logic
are classical [15].
This means that as long as the bivaluation [[P ]]b = b ∈ {1, 0} can be interpreted as the dispersion-
free probability measure, propositions from one and the same context Σ must obey the Kolmogorov
axioms [16].
In particular, the probability that the disjunction of the propositions P1x+ and P1x− is verified,
that is, Pr[P1x+ ⊔ P1x− is true], must be equal to the sum of the probabilities of the propositions
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P1x+ and P1x− being verified, i.e., Pr[P1x+ is true] and Pr[P1x− is true]. Since on each context Σ
the probabilities add to 1, the condition (33) then follows:
Pr
[
P1x+ is true
]
+ Pr
[
P1x− is true
]
=
[[
P1x+
]]
b
+
[[
P1x−
]]
b
= 1 . (36)
Nevertheless, even supposing that the hypothesis 1 is correct, the question remains: How does a
probability concept appear in an empirical logic? For, without Kolmogorov’s axiomatic system one
cannot ground the requirement of admissibility for the quantum propositions.
Of course, one may simply assume that a probability space exists for the quantum propositions
and then introduce the admissibility requirement. But in that case, the rejection of truth-values of
the counterfactually definite kind, such as (23) and (28), turns out to be some additional postulate
unwarranted by the Hilbert space formalism.
Hence, replacing this postulate by a derivation resulting from the Hilbert space formalism would
be a greatly desirable as a means to resolve the EPR paradox.
5 The structure of invariant-subspace lattices free from pasting
When there is no gathering into the Hilbert lattice L(H) of the invariant-subspace lattices L(Σ)
of the contexts Σ associated with the quantum system, the nonidentical subspaces H′ and H′′ be-
longing to the different lattices L(Σ′) and L(Σ′′) cannot be in one (partially ordered) set.
This means, in particular, that for the subspaces HNz± ∈ L(ΣNz) where ΣNz = {PNz+, PNz−} and
the subspaces HNx± ∈ L(ΣNx) where ΣNx = {PNx+, PNx−}, ordering relation has no meaning at
all since {HNz±,HNx±} are not subsets of any set L(ΣNq) from the collection
{
L(ΣNq)
}
q∈R3
≡
{
q ∈ R3 :
{
{0} , HNq+ , HNq− , C
2
}}
, (37)
where q represents an arbitrary axis. In other words, within this collection, the subspaces HNz±
and HNx± are neither comparable nor incomparable. This can be expressed equivalently by stating
that the lattice-theoretic meet cannot be defined on such elements, which in symbols can be written
down as
{HNz±,HNx±} ⊆ L(ΣNq) ∈
{
L(ΣNq)
}
q∈R3
: HNz±✚∧ HNx± , (38)
where the diagonal strikeout over ∧ signifies that under the condition of no pasting into L(HN ) the
meet operation ∧ cannot be defined for the indicated subspaces (recall that the meet is defined as
an operation on pairs of elements from one partially ordered set).
9
But if the subspaces H1z± are neither comparable nor incomparable with the subspaces H1x±,
the counter-factual truth-values of the quantum propositions P1x± in the states |Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z± are
meaningless, i.e., without the truth values. This can be expressed by
{H1z±,H1x±} ⊆ L(Σ1q) ∈
{
L(Σ1q)
}
q∈R3
:
[[
P1x±
(
|Ψ1〉 ∈ H1z+
)]]
b
=
0
0
, (39)
where 0
0
denotes an indeterminate value. Similarly,
{H1z±⊗H2z∓ , H1x±⊗H2x∓} ⊆ L(Σ)∈{L(Σ)}Σ∈O :
[[
(P1x± ⊓ P2x∓) (|Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1)
]]
b
=
0
0
. (40)
Speaking in general terms, in the case that the quantum propositions P and Q are affiliated with
the different non-intertwined contexts ΣP and ΣQ (meaning that ΣP and ΣQ do not share common
elements [13]) and, consequently, the subspaces HP and HQ representing P and Q are from the
different non-intertwined lattices, namely, HP ⊆ L(ΣP ) and HQ ⊆ L(ΣQ), propositional counter-
factual definiteness cannot appear. Hence, in the structure of the collection {L(ΣP ),L(ΣQ), . . . }
with no pasting, the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness (5) does not hold true:
∃ {HQ,HP }  ⊆ L(Σ) ∈ {L(ΣP ),L(ΣQ), . . . } :
[[
P
(
|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ
)]]
b
=
0
0
. (41)
More to this point, consider the sequence S of the quantum propositions relating to the system of
two entangled spin-half particles examined in the section 3:
S =
(
(P1z+⊓P2z−) , (P1z−⊓P2z+) , (P1x+⊓P2x−) , (P1x−⊓P2x+)
)
. (42)
Within the structure {L(Σ)}Σ∈O free from pasting, the population of the truth-values for S in the
states |Ψ12〉 ∈ Z1,2 are tuples T1 and T2 that do not include counterfactually definite truth-values
for incompatible propositions:
T1 =
(
1, 0,
0
0
,
0
0
)
, (43)
T2 =
(
0, 1,
0
0
,
0
0
)
. (44)
6 Conclusion remarks
As it is shown through the logic account of the EPR paradox, to avoid the paradoxical inference
(31), one can deny (apart from the completeness of quantum mechanics) either the principle of
locality or the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness.
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But then again, in the union of the collection {L(Σ)}Σ∈O, the counter-factual truth-values are
always definite. Indeed, because in this union, a pair of closed linear subspaces HQ and HP is ei-
ther comparable or incomparable, the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness holds
true. So, if one is unwilling to abandon the principle of locality in the union of {L(Σ)}Σ∈O, one is
compelled to introduce one more hypothesis – namely, the requirement of admissibility – just to
make void counterfactually definite truth-values of incompatible propositions holding in this union.
By contrast, in the collection {L(Σ)}Σ∈O free from pasting, the closed linear subspaces representing
incompatible propositions are neither comparable nor incomparable with each other. As a result,
propositional counter-factual definiteness cannot exist for such propositions.
One can conclude from this that the Hilbert lattice L(H), i.e., the union of the collection {L(Σ)}Σ∈O,
is an unnecessary assumption in an empiric logic.
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